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INTRODUCTION

To the dismay of many childless couples, adoptions today are on
the decline.' Radical reformation of current adoption laws and a
metamorphosis of our society's view toward women in relation to
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of North Dakota School of Law; B.A.,
1973, J.D., 1977, University of Kansas; LL.M. 1990, Temple University. The author is
indebted to Marina Angel and Ellen Podgor for their invaluable assistance and numerous
comments on earlier drafts.
1. Beginning in the early 1970s, adoptions decreased substantially with some states
experiencing decreases by as much as 50%. David F. Tegeler, Comment, Advertisingfor
Adoption Placement. Gray Market Activities in a Gray Area of Constitutional Protection,
25 DUQ. L. REV. 129, 131 (1986).
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these laws must be effected immediately. The number of infants2
available for adoption continues to dwindle while the number of
families longing to adopt these children increases. 3 The baby market has become a lucrative operation as a result of the easy accessibility of contraception, 4 the legalization of abortion,5 the growing
acceptance of an unwed mother's decision to rear her out-of-wedlock child,6 and the escalation of infertility.7 As adoption waiting
lists expand, desperate couples, eager to establish or expand a family, explore any and every attainable means to procure infants for
adoption.' Opportunists appear to prey upon and exploit the
desperation of these people. 9 Because the demand for infants far
exceeds the supply, a black market has evolved 0 which often takes
advantage of the parties involved: the adoptive parents, the birth
parents, and the child. This Article advocates that changes are
needed in the adoption laws to stem these abuses.
This Article initially examines the historical framework for
adoption.'I It then analyzes the dual vehicles presently employed
in the adoption realm;' 2 namely, agency 3 and independent 4 adop2. When speaking about the lack of infants available for adoption, this Article refers
to healthy Caucasian infants. Although numerous African-American, handicapped, and
older children are available for adoption, unfortunately, there are few couples desiring to
adopt these children.
3. Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and
Proposalsfor Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10, 14 (1975).
4. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (granting minors the
right to access contraceptives and birth control information).
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (granting women the right to abortion in certain
circumstances); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (granting minors the right
to secure an abortion); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976) (granting minors the right to abortion in some circumstances without parental
consent).
6. Howard LaFranchi, Couples Target Texas in Searchfor Newborns, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 11, 1989, at 1 (explaining that more than 90% of unwed pregnant women choose to keep their babies).
7. Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice,Issues & Laws 1958-1983, 17 FAM. L.Q.
173, 195 (1983); see also Mitchell A. Charney, The Rebirth of Private Adoptions, A.B.A.
J., June 1985, at 52, 53 (noting that as of 1985, there were more than three million infertile couples of child-bearing age in the United States).
8. See infra notes 103, 110 and accompanying text.
9. See Timothy Clifford, DA Probes Baby-Selling Scam, NEWSDAY (New York), Feb.
2, 1989, at 8 (citing evidence that a group of lawyers and doctors were involved in selling
babies for up to $100,000); see also infra note 110 and accompanying text (describing
other exploitations).
10. See infra part II.C.
11. See infra part II.A.
12. See infra part II.B.
13. Margaret V. Turano, Note, Black-Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAW. 48, 52-53
(1976). Turano explains:
In an agency adoption, the prospective parents, upon submitting their applica-
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tions, and discusses the resulting current and potential black market for children created by the present adoption systems.' 5
This Article next discusses state laws governing adoption and
the corresponding compensation of birth mothers. 6 It then explores the methodology that has emerged from court decisions
evaluating the exchange of money in adoption cases.17 Courts have
employed a two-tiered test to determine the types of compensation
allowable for birth mothers who release their children for adoption. 8 This discussion includes a critical evaluation of the application (or misapplication) 19 and the fallacious theoretical basis of this
two-tiered test20 and considers other possible approaches to the
problem of compensating birth mothers. 2 Finally, this Article
concludes with proposals for reforming existing adoption laws to
make them more equitable.22
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

The History of Adoption

Although Roman law is the unquestioned source of American
adoption legislation,23 adoption was practiced well before Roman
times by the Assyrian, Greek, and Egyptian people, with some
tion for adoption, are interviewed and investigated by the agency to determine
their fitness as parents. Once approved, they are placed on the agency's waiting
list until a child whom the agency considers suitable becomes available for
adoption. They are then allowed to take the child. The placement stage thus
completed, the parents petition the court for a decree of adoption. The court
then authorizes its own investigation to determine whether the child is being
satisfactorily assimilated into the new family. If the investigation reveals that
parents and child are adjusting well, a court order of adoption is granted.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
14. Id. Turano continues:
Independent adoptions are those not effected by agencies. In an independent
adoption, there is seldom any requirement that adoptive parents be evaluated
before placement. The placement is usually arranged by an intermediary, and
the choice of parents often is entirely within [the intermediary's] discretion. After the child has been placed in the prospective home, however, the family, if it
wishes to adopt the child, must follow the same court procedure followed in an
agency adoption.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
15. See infra part II.C.
16. See infra part III.A.
17. See infra part III.B.
18. See infra part III.B.
19. See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
21. See infra part III.C.
22. See infra part V.
23. John F. Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 332 (1922).
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adoptions occurring as far back as 2285 B.C. among the Babylonian people. 24 The Babylonian law on adoption, found in the Code
of Hammurabi written in 2285 B.C., suggests that concern for a
voluntary consent to adoption dates back to the beginning of adoption law. 25 Further, the Greeks celebrated adoption with provisions that certain formalities attend the adoption ceremony and
that it occur during specified festivals.26 And27 of course, who does
not recall the renowned adoption of Moses?
The Romans had two disparate forms of adoption-adrogation
and adoption. 2 Adrogation allowed the adoption of a person who
was sui generis and independent, a situation that generally comprised the adoption of an adult. 29 In ancient times adoptions fulfilled the purpose of extending blood lines. Fathers without sons
used adoption to establish families to ensure that the family line
endured. 30 The Romans viewed adoption as "the legal act whereby
a person who was in the power of the natural head of his family
passed out of the power of such paterfamilias to fall under the
paternal power of a new father or head of a family."'3

As a result,

the person adopted acquired the rights and responsibilities of a
birth child. In general, Roman adoption law furthered the two expansive objectives of "avoiding extinction of
the family and perpet'3 2
uating rites of family [religious] worship.

Moreover, certain essential prerequisites were required to effectuate a valid adoption: (1) the adoption was required to emulate
nature, and (2) the adoptee had to satisfy distinct age require24. Howe, supra note 7, at 173; see also Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971) (providing a thorough
discussion of the historical background of adoption).
25. Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S.W. 585, 586-87 (Mo. 1906) (citing §§ 185-93 of the
CODE OF HAMMURABI (2285 B.C.), which allowed adoption, but mandated at § 186 that
"[i]f a man has taken a young child to sonship and when he took him his father and
mother rebelled, that nursling shall return to his father's house"); Howe, supra note 7, at
173 n.2; see also Leo A. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L.
REV. 743, 744 (1956) (discussing the CODE OF HAMMURABI and ancient adoption
practices).
26. Brosnan, supra note 23, at 333.
27. Exodus 2:10 ("And she adopted him for a son and called him Moses, saying I
took him out of water.").
28. Brosnan, supra note 23, at 332.
29. Id.
30. Howe, supra note 7, at 174; see also Presser, supra note 24, at 446 (noting that
unlike modern adoption laws, which are designed to serve the best interests of the child,
ancient adoption laws, particularly Roman laws, served the purpose of avoiding the extinction of the family and perpetuating the rights of the family).
31. Brosnan, supra note 23, at 332.
32. Presser, supra note 24, at 446.

1991]

Compensation For Birth Mothers

ments.33 In order to imitate nature, a son needed to be younger
than his father. Therefore, satisfaction of the second prerequisite
necessarily satisfied the first prerequisite. 4 Women, however, were
not permitted by Roman law to adopt until after 291 A.D., and
even then, women were allowed only a "limited form of adoption
to comfort them for the loss of children taken from them. ' 35
Moving from antiquity to modernity, England did not recognize
adoption36 until the ratification of the Adoption of Children Act of
1926. 3v Consequently, many claim that adoption was not part of
our American common law. 38 Adoption, however, was practiced
by the indigenous people of North America, the Native Americans. 39 In 1846, Mississippi became the first state to enact an adoption statute. 4° Eventually, all the other states followed. 4'
Although American adoption statutes pattern themselves after Roman law, there is a critical distinction between the two. While Roman adoption law was developed around the needs and rights of
the adoptive parents, American adoption law has been aimed primarily at safeguarding the welfare of adopted children.42 Indeed,
the first American adoption laws were passed in response to several
instances in which adults took children into their homes and
treated them as their own, yet upon the death of the "adoptive
parent(s)," the children were not entitled to receive any inheritance
because they had not been legally adopted.43
By the mid-1800s, rampant poverty in the United States forced
many children to live on the streets. In an effort to ameliorate this
undesirable social phenomenon, child welfare societies began a cru33. Brosnan, supra note 23, at 333.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Presser, supra note 24, at 448-55 (discussing the failure of the English common law to recognize the legality of adoption).
37. Adoption of Children Act of 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 29 (Eng.); 17 HALSBURY,
LAWS OF ENGLAND §§ 1406-23 (2d ed. 1935); see Huard, supra note 25, at 746.
38. Abe W. Waldauer, State Regulation of Child Adoptions, 17 TENN. L. REV. 937,
938 (1943).
39. Huard, supra note 25, at 748.
40. See Catherine N. McFarlane, The Mississippi Law on Adoptions, 10 Miss. L.J.
239, 240 (1938) (stating that Mississippi enacted its first adoption statute in 1846); Woodward's Appeal, 70 A. 453, 457 (Conn. 1908); cf Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 262 (1878)
(stating that in 1851, Massachusetts was "[o]ne of the first, if not the very first of the
States ...to introduce [an adoption statute]").
41. See Presser, supra note 24, at 443. Within 25 years of the passage of the first
adoption laws, 24 states had enacted adoption laws. Id.
42. Howe, supra note 7, at 174.
43. See, e.g., Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243 (1878).
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sade to induce families to adopt these children." During this period, adoptions served the welfare of the state as well as the welfare
of children by extricating a child from a life of poverty or from life
in a charitable institution, and by placing the child in a more desirable environment.45
Soon thereafter, however, the adoption picture turned bleak.
Parents became careless about how and where they placed their
children for adoption. Children's societies placed "uninvestigated
children in uninvestigated homes,"' and these homes commonly
exploited the children as a cheap source of labor.47 Some children
were sold or given away for adoption by their parents.48 Such occurrences led the Massachusetts legislature to compel judges to determine the fitness of the adoptive parents and their home before
granting an adoption. Consequently, the courts created the "best
interests of the child" test as a method of determining adoptive
fitness.49
By the 1920s, some experts began to regard adoption as a bane
instead of a boon for the homeless child. Experts criticized judges
for mechanically granting adoptions without questioning whether
adoption was actually in the best interests of the child. Child welfare experts castigated this judicial practice because they believed
that couples were routinely adopting children for uncharitable purposes.50 Welfare agencies began discouraging adoptions and began
advocating that children would be better off in children's homes
instead of in adoptive homes.' Nevertheless, by the 1950s, adoption once again became a popular means to rescue a child from a
life of poverty, an institutional home, or an indifferent family.
Howe, supra note 7, at 176. Howe explains:
By the mid 1800s many east coast cities were plagued by gangs of street
urchins. New York City in 1850 had about 10,000 vagrant children, wandering
homeless, committing minor crimes, and living in great misery.... Children's
aid societies rounded up thousands of children and sent them west to farms
where their hands were welcome. Newspapers of the day carried advertisements for children wanted for adoption, and parents either sold or gave them
away.

44.

Id.
45. Id.
46. Presser, supra note 24, at 460.
47. Howe, supra note 7, at 176.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 176-77.
50. See generally Joseph W. Newbold, Jurisdictionaland Social Aspects of Adoption,
11 MINN. L. REV. 605, 606-07 (1927) (providing examples of cases that led agencies to
believe adoptions were being undertaken for uncharitable purposes).
51. Id. at 606.
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From the late 1950s and into the 1960s, more infants became available for adoption, agencies actively sought couples, and waiting
lists were short.5 2 Almost cyclically, however, by the end of the
1960s and into the 1970s, the function of adoption once again began to change. Families no longer were adopting solely to help an
impoverished child; rather, childless couples were adopting as a
means of satisfying an intense longing to have a family.
As the "pro-family" movement 53 blossomed, so did the desire to
adopt infants. Today, though one incentive to adopt still may include a wish to propagate the family line, the key focus is upon
creating a parent-child relationship.5 4 Unfortunately, this emphasis upon the parent-child relationship emerged simultaneously with
the increasing acceptance of out-of-wedlock children, the onslaught of contraceptive technology, and the soaring infertility rate
among married couples.55 Consequently, a shortage of infants
available for adoption has developed.5 6 As this shortage continues
and the competition for infants increases, the lines of demarcation
between agency and independent adoptions grow more pronounced, with advocates on both sides touting the advantages and
disadvantages of both adoption systems.
B.

Agency Versus Independent Adoption

Laws regulating the methods of adoption vary from state to

58
state. 57 Some states absolutely prohibit independent adoptions,

while others permit them to varying degrees.5 9 Consequently,
birth mothers and adopting parents often forum shop for the state
52. Howe, supra note 7, at 180.
53. This is technically known as the social movement directed toward emphasis on
the nuclear family.
54. See Howe, supra note 7, at 177.
55. Tegeler, supra note 1, at 131-32; Charney, supra note 7, at 53.
56. As early as the 1940s, there were reports of 30 applicants for every child available
for adoption. Waldauer, supra note 38, at 937.
57. See generally Paul T. Fullerton, Independent Adoption: The Inadequaciesof State
Law, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 753 (1985) (analyzing several aspects of state adoption statutes
including regulations on who may place children for adoption, investigations of adoptive
parents, residency requirements, restrictions on the importation of children, disclosure of
adoption expenses, and violations of the adoption laws).
58. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904 (1981 & Supp. 1991) (permitting adoption only through authorizedagencies).
59. See e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.473 (Baldwin 1970) (requiring all persons
other than licensed agencies to submit a written application to place or receive a child for
adoption); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422.3 (West 1965 & Supp. 1991) (permitting private
adoption); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.07 (West 1989) (a 1987 amendment deleted a
requirement that an adoption petition must be filed by an agency authorized by the Texas
Department of Human Services to place children for adoption).
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that offers them the most propitious adoption laws. Due to this,
child welfare advocates have recognized a need for and urged uniformity in the laws governing adoptions. 6°
Depending upon the laws of each state, individuals or couples
may adopt through agencies or through independent means.6 I In a
typical agency adoption,62 commonly referred to as a "white market adoption," the birth mother 63 surrenders her child directly to
an agency. The agency then places the child in an adoptive home
selected through agency procedures. These agency procedures
usually conform to national guidelines such as those promulgated
by the Child Welfare League of America. Once the agency is assured that the adoptive home is acceptable, the agency then consents to the adoption. 64

In contrast, in an independent adoption,65 frequently called a
"gray market adoption," the birth mother normally uses an intermediary to help her through the adoption process, but it is the
birth mother who actually consents to the adoption by the adoptive
parents.66 In addition, whereas agency adoptions must conform to
certain national guidelines, independent adoptions are subject only
to state laws. Independent adoptions, therefore, permit the birth
mother a greater degree of control over the adoption than do
agency adoptions in which the primary control rests with the
60. Daniel G. Grove, Independent Adoptions: The Case for the Grey Market, 13
VILL. L. REV. 116, 123 (1967); George W. Myers, Jr., Comment, Independent Adoptions:
Is the Black and White Beginning to Appear in the Controversy Over Grey-Market Adoptions?, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 629, 631 (1980); Natalie H. Wallisch, Note, Independent Adoption: Regulating the Middleman, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 354-56 (1985).
61. See, e.g., statutes cited supra notes 58-59.
62. For a thorough discussion of agency adoptions, see JOAN MCNAMARA, THE
ADOPrION ADVISER 44-63 (1975). McNamara explains that agency adoptions usually
involve one of three different types of adoption agencies: public agencies, which are typically run by government departments of welfare or social services; private agencies,
which generally deal with a broad range of homeless children; and sectarian agencies,
which specialize in adoptions for children and parents of a specific religion. Id. For an
explanation of the distinctions between independent and agency adoptions, see supra
notes 13-14.
63. Although it is certainly true that birth fathers may be involved in the adoption
process, that occurrence unfortunately is rare and it is usually the birth mother who must
deal with this crisis. Consequently, this Article refers to birth mothers.
64. Tegeler, supra note 1, at 131.
65. For a discussion of independent adoptions, see MCNAMARA, supra note 62, at 7484. McNamara observes that private adoptions, also referred to as independent or gray
market adoptions, are those that are generally arranged by attorneys, obstetricians, clergymen or other intermediaries without utilizing the services of a licensed adoption
agency. Id.
66. CHILDREN'S HOME SOCIETY OF CAL., THE CHANGING PICTURE OF ADOPTION
12 (1984).
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agency.67
Agency and independent adoptions are also procedurally disparate in their investigative approaches to adoptions. Agencies typically mandate that adopting parents conform with a strict set of
conditions before they are eligible to adopt. 68 To determine
whether these conditions have been satisfied, agencies utilize a variety of criteria to evaluate potential adoptive families including
race, ethnicity, religion, and age.69 Moreover, agencies require a
home study70 before placing a child in an adoptive home. Agencies
justify the use of these standards because they provide a means of
monitoring and evaluating adoption applicants and thereby enable
the agency to consider the child's best interests.7 '
Independent adoptions, on the other hand, usually involve simpler investigative procedures. Since the primary control in an independent adoption rests with the birth mother and not with an
agency, independent adoptions do not necessarily require any strict
pre-adoption investigation. In fact, the completion of a home
study in independent adoptions is not done until after the child has
been placed in the home.72
Agency and independent adoptions also differ in terms of the
amount of privacy they afford to the parties involved. 3 Because of
the strict set of conditions agencies impose, agencies are more in67.

WILLIAM MEEZAN ET AL., ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES; A STUDY OF IN-

DEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 37-38 (1978). Birth mothers reportedly turn away from agency
adoptions because of the number, perceived arbitrariness, and perceived inappropriateness of the agency requirements. Id.
68. See Linda F. Smith, Adoption-The Case for More Options, 1986 UTAH L. REV.
495, 527-28 (criticizing agency confidentiality requirements); Constance J. Miller, Comment, Best Interests of Children and the Interests of Adoptive Parents: Isn't it Time for
Comprehensive Reform?, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 749 (1986) (examining agency requirements
and the related constitutional interests of adoptive parents); see also MEEZAN ET AL.,
supra note 67, at 37-38 (observing that adopting couples come under much less scrutiny
in independent adoptions).
69. Miller, supra note 68, at 749.
70. A typical home study requires a social worker to visit an adoptive family's home,
verify their references, and eventually make a recommendation regarding the suitability
of the family as an adoptive placement.
71. Cf Miller, supra note 68, at 776-97 (discussing the constitutionality of using such
criteria).
72. Myers, supra note 60, at 633.
73. See In re Emanuel T., 365 N.Y.S.2d 709, 716 (Fam. Ct.), rev'd sub nom. Matter
of Infant S., 370 N.Y.S.2d 93 (App. Div. 1975). Upon questioning by the trial judge, a
birth mother and maternal grandmother explained that they sought a private adoption
instead of an agency adoption because it spared them from having to answer embarrassing questions about the birth mother's out-of-wedlock pregnancy at a time when it troubled her to speak about it and because she believed the attorney handling the adoption
would help her to find a good home for her child. Id.
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quisitive into the private lives of all the parties involved in the
adoption."4 In an agency adoption, the identity of the birth mother
may be kept confidential, regardless of the parties' wishes. In contrast, independent adoptions may not provide any assurance that
the birth mother's identity will remain undisclosed. Consequently,
as the birth mother often will choose to unveil her identity, birth
mothers and adoptive parents are increasingly seeking private
adoptions," because they usually have fewer demands and allow
the parties to choose the degree of privacy.
Another distinction between the two adoption methods is the
risks and benefits each offers. First, agencies counsel both the birth
mother and the adopting parents during the adoption process,
while independent adoptions often do not provide any counseling.7 6 Second, birth mothers are responsible for their own medical
and hospital payments in agency adoptions, but it is quite common
in independent adoptions for the adopting parents to pay the birth
mother's medical and hospital expenses related to childbirth.
Third, agencies generally provide government subsidized medical
care, but in independent adoptions, birth mothers are usually able
to select their own physicians as well as the medical facility of their
choice.77 Finally, because independent adoptions are controlled by
the birth mother and the adopting parents and not by an independent third party, independent adoptions pose a greater risk that the
adoption process will never be completed and that the birth mother
ultimately will reclaim her child.78
Agency and independent adoptions also differ in the amount of
time and cost involved in each process. Because agency adoptions
require stricter investigative procedures, independent adoptions
traditionally may be accomplished in a considerably shorter period
74.

MEEZAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 229.

75. As of 1975, it was estimated that more than 75% of all adoptions were handled
through agencies. Tegeler, supra note 1, at 131. Sources now claim, however, that private adoptions account for anywhere from one-third to approximately one-half of all
adoptions of healthy white infants. Robert Lindsey, Adoption Market: Big Demand,
Tight Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1987, § 1, pt. 1, at 1.

76. Counseling furnishes an extra safety feature in the independent setting and may
help curtail unethical practices. Myers, supra note 60, at 642; Miller, supra note 68, at
802. Moreover, counseling may assist birth mothers in understanding the adoption process and in dealing with the emotional trauma of relinquishing their children for adoption. As a result, counseling increases the likelihood that consents to adoption are
voluntary, informed, and therefore irrevocable. Wallisch, supra note 60, at 342; see
MEEZAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 117-19.
77. Jane A. Robert, Comment, ParentalConsent: The Needfor an Informed Decision
in the Private Adoption Scheme, 47 LA. L. REV. 889, 890 (1987).
78. MEEZAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 28-34.
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of time79 than agency adoptions 80 and offer immediate placement
of a child in an adoptive home.8 ' Finally, although independent
adoptions offer the advantage of greater speed, they are more
costly than agency adoptions because the adoptive parents often
pay the birth mother's medical and hospital expenses related to
childbirth. 82
A major study, entitled Adoptions Without Agencies, commissioned by the Child Welfare League of America and completed in
1978, compared families who adopt through agencies with families
who pursue private adoptions.83 The agencies participating in the
study rated most of the independent homes as equal to or better
than the agency homes with respect to the physical and emotional
care provided to an adopted child. 4 The study also found that
approximately two-thirds of the independent adoption intermediaries interviewed believed that there were areas where they
could cooperate with agencies and that this type .of collaboration
might diminish the risks involved in independent placements.8 5
The intermediaries suggested joint participation in the following
areas: agency counseling for birth mothers and adoptive parents
involved in independent adoptions, and agency performance of
home studies before independent adoption placement.8 6 In addition to assisting independent adoptions, providing these services
may also furnish agencies with a source of much needed funding.
The study also found that birth mothers increasingly use the independent system because they can choose quality private medical
79. It is not uncommon for couples pursuing agency adoptions to be placed on waiting lists that may be over three years long. Id. at 228. Over one-half of the agencies
surveyed in the study, Adoptions Without Agencies, reported that waiting lists for adop-

tive couples currently were closed and those that remained open often were three years
long. Id.
80. Id. at 78. Half of the adopting couples in the above sample had a child placed
with them within six months of approaching an intermediary. Most couples seeking children through the agency adoption process had a baby placed in their home within twelve
to eighteen months. Id. at 228-29; see Charney, supra note 7, at 53-55.
81. MEEZAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 144.
82.

Carol S. Silverman, Regulating Independent Adoptions, 22 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.

323, 331 n.80 (1989).
83. MEEZAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 17-32.
84. Id. at 232. A similar 1963 study found no significant quantitative difference between agency and private adoptions in unsatisfactory placements. Myers, supra note 60,
at 634. In contrast, the National Committee For Adoption, a Washington-based committee representing over 135 private, not-for-profit adoption agencies, claims that the failure
rate for independent adoptions is twice as high as the failure rate for agency adoptions.
Silverman, supra note 82, at 334 n.94.
PROBS.

85.

MEEZAN ET AL.,

86.

Id.

supra note 67, at 143.
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care instead of relying on welfare-provided medical care. Additionally, because birth mothers are more likely to receive help with
medical, housing, and other living expenses, independent place87
ments are more appealing to them.
Although independent adoptions were employed as early as the
1920s, 8 in the past ten or fifteen years, they have increased in popularity compared to agency adoptions. 9 The modem trend is to
permit independent adoptions, 9° but to control them through limitations on compensation and requirements for court-ordered home
studies. 91 In addition, agencies currently are facing severe fiscal
crises and, as a result, may have difficulty meeting even the minimal medical costs of birth mothers.9 2 In response, agencies are
likely to develop creative ways of providing these services. At least
one agency suggested that the adoptive parents pay the birth
mother's medical costs. 93 Adopting this proposal would eliminate
a significant difference between agency and private placements.
Another suggestion is that greater funding be appropriated to state
agencies in states where independent adoptions are outlawed. 94
Moreover, legalizing independent adoptions or relaxing regulations
87. Id. at 37-38.
88. See Newbold, supra note 50, at 622. Advertisements of children for adoption by
people who objected to the amount of red tape required for an agency adoption appeared
in newspapers as early as the 1920s. Id.
89. See Myers, supra note 60, at 629; cf Richard R. Carlson, TransnationalAdoption
of Children, 23 TULSA L.J. 317 (1988) (discussing the increase in popularity of transnational adoptions caused by the shortage of healthy, adoptable infants born in the United
States). For a general discussion of the inherent problems in the independent adoption
process and proposals for the elimination of these problems, see CHILDREN'S HOME SOCIETY OF CAL., supra note 66, at 12. One prominent study reported that before pursuing
independent adoptions, 70% of adoptive couples first attempted to adopt through agencies. See MEEZAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 82.
90. See James A. Shrybman & Patricia V. Fettmen, Why Make PrivateAdoptions So
Difficult? WASH. POST, July 2, 1989, (Editorial), at C8. Legislation recently passed in
Virginia restricts the reimbursement of medical expenses and financial assistance that a
birth mother may receive from adoptive parents, and also prohibits birth mothers from
receiving help with housing, food, or clothing during their pregnancies if they utilize the
independent adoption process. Id. Birth mothers may collect this compensation, however, if they surrender their children for adoption through agencies. Id. All parties involved in the adoption process including birth mothers, adoptive parents and experts,
except, of course, agencies, roundly criticized this new law. Id.
91. Tegeler, supra note 1, at 152.
92. CHILDREN'S HOME SOCIETY OF CAL., supra note 66, at 124-25 (1985); see also In
re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925, 934 (Pa. 1986) (Hutchinson, J., dissenting) (recognizing
that "the economic realities of shrinking government aid for social services cannot be
ignored" and that "it is becoming more difficult for ... adoption agencies to meet their
financial needs through donations").
93. CHILDREN'S HOME SOCIETY OF CAL., supra note 66, at 125.
94. Tegeler, supra note 1, at 132.
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for private adoptions in these states may help to ease the financial
burden on agencies.
Why do we have two different schemes for adoption? Agencies
offer a more secure approach to adoption because they follow
traditional guidelines such as mandatory counseling for all involved parties, confidentiality, and controlled placement of the
child. Private placements are considered riskier because counseling is not required and because the birth mother's direct involvement creates a greater possibility that she will change her mind
about the adoption.9 5 Yet it is important that both systems remain.
There is no demonstrative evidence that agency placements are
more beneficial than private ones. Moreover, the absence of a monopoly on adoptive placements "ha[s] been found to have salutary
effects on the efficiency of agency procedure. ' 96 Maintaining both
systems, agency and private adoptions, has the advantage of each
system keeping a check on the other. Nevertheless, this competition between agencies and independent adoptions has fueled the
debate over the black market.
C. The Black Market
A major concern with independent adoptions is that only a subtle transition is required to move an adoptive parent from the gray
market into the black market. 97 The paramount difference between
the two adoption markets is the existence of a profit motive. Thus,
the critical inquiry is whether intermediaries are finding adoptive
homes in exchange for reasonable fees or for profit. 98
Whenever demand exceeds supply, conditions are ripe for a
black market. 99 The case of babies, unfortunately, is no different. 1oo Though the existence of a black market has been recognized
for some time, the situation has worsened in recent years due to the
swelling imbalance between the supply of and the demand for in95. See Robert, supra note 77, at 890 (discussing disadvantages of agency adoptions
and proposing tightened guidelines for private adoptions); see also Silverman, supra note
82, at 323, 329-31 (providing a critical look at private adoptions from an agency
viewpoint).
96. Bodenheimer, supra note 3, at 108.
97. MCNAMARA, supra note 62, at 74-84. The black market has been defined as
those adoptions that involve an intermediary whose business is earning a profit by selling
infants. Wallisch, supra note 60, at 333. The controlling factor becomes the ability to
pay and not the fitness of the parents or the best interests of the child. Id.
98. MCNAMARA, supra note 62, at 80.
99. Turano, supra note 13, at 48; see Wallisch, supra note 60, at 333.
100. See generally Turano, supra note 13, at 48-53 (discussing the black market,
weaknesses in independent adoptions, and suggesting reforms).
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fants available for adoption.°10 A black market for infants was detected as early as the 1950s, 1°2 and reports continue that the baby
business still flourishes. 103 Obviously, it is difficult to acquire accurate statistics regarding such behavior because black market activities are illegal in all states."o Although most states have statutory
restrictions regarding the exchange of money between parties in an
adoptive placement,10 5 enforcement is very difficult, if not impossible, without the support of the concerned parties."
There is general agreement that the black market involves only a
handful of independent adoptions, 10 7 and that these usually take
place in states with the weakest adoption laws and procedures. 0 I
Frantic people often behave in extreme ways' °9 as shown by reported acts of desperation over the past few years. 10 This type of
101. Id. at 48.
102. See, e.g., Juvenile Delinquency (InterstateAdoption Practice): Hearings on Juvenile Delinquency in the U.S. Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); Turano, supra note 13, at 48 n.2.
103. E.R. Shipp, Death Draws Public's Eye to Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1987,
at BI (noting that adoption experts say that there is a booming market for the sale of
healthy white infants with prices that may range from $20,000 to $75,000); see also
MEEZAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 148 (stating that in a study of private adoptions, 56%
of facilitators believed there were organized rings of doctors, lawyers, and hospitals arranging adoptions "for profit"); Lindsey, supra note 75, at 1 (quoting federal authorities
as saying that a rising demand for healthy white infants has led to a proliferation of
organized rings that smuggle babies across the border and then sell them to the highest
bidder in the United States).
104. See Tegeler, supra note 1, at 133. For both an analysis of the problems created
by a black market in children and proposed remedies, see Turano, supra note 13, at 4853.
105. Tegeler, supra note 1, at 133.
106. See MEEZAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 11.
107. Wallisch, supra note 60, at 334.
108. Id.; Myers, supra note 60, at 631. Testimony before the United States Senate
indicates that black market placements involve at least one state with relatively weak
adoption laws and procedures, and that the only way to remedy this situation and combat
the black market for children is to have national uniformity in the adoption laws. Id.
(citing S. REP. No. 167, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1978)); see also Turano, supra note
13, at 60-61 (discussing the operations of the black market).
109. See Lindsey, supra note 75, at 1 (citing examples of couples who have sought
babies by placing notices on cars at shopping centers, parking lots, park benches, and
railroad overpasses); Turano, supra note 13, at 48-53; see also MEEZAN ET AL., supra
note 67, at 77 (explaining that legally questionable adoptions occur in all strata of our
society and thus are not relegated to specific societal groups or conditions).
110. Tearful Mom Pleadsfor Baby Back, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 21, 1989, at I B (reporting that a mother in Florida reportedly entered a hospital under the name of the
proposed adoptive mother and then, after the birth of the child, turned the infant over to
the adoptive couple in return for $1,100, a plane ticket, and other gifts); see also BabySelling Case, WASH. POST, May 17, 1989, metro final edition, at C6 (noting that a woman
accused of trading her infant son for money and drugs received a three-year suspended
sentence after pleading guilty to conspiring to sell cocaine); Clifford, supra note 9, at 8
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activity is not limited to any one class of people, but instead occurs
in all strata of our society. Age, family income, length of marriage,
and the number of children already in a family have no direct correlation to legally questionable activities in adoptions."'
Interestingly, most black market adoptions are not detrimental
to the welfare of the child. 1 2 The procurement of these children is
not for illegal or immoral purposes, and the adoptive parents are
usually not criminals or unfit parents. They are desperate people
with the financial ability to purchase a child." 3
Thus, at least two authors have proposed the legalization of the
black market as a solution to the baby shortage." 4 One author of
this proposal, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, rests the foundation of his legalization analysis on the
economics of supply and demand. Indeed, the article containing
this proposal is popularly referred to as "the baby-selling article," a
(stating that after the death of Lisa Steinberg in New York, an investigation into private
adoptions allegedly uncovered evidence that six lawyers and a number of doctors were
involved in a scheme to sell white babies for up to $100,000); Patricia Hurtado, Couple
Accused of Running IllegalAdoption Agency, NEWSDAY (New York), June 22, 1988, city
edition, at 3 (reporting that a Brooklyn couple and their lawyer were charged with operating an illegal adoption agency by paying pregnant women $2,000 for their children and
then selling the children to the highest bidder); It's a Seller's Market, LIFE, Sept. 1988,
family, at 80 ("With 100 couples vying for each healthy white infant, hopeful adoptive
parents go to greater lengths to obtain a child."); Claudia Levy, Baby Selling on the Rise,
Officials Say, Arrest of Pennsylvania Couple Said to Reflect Hidden Problem, WASH.
POST, July 19, 1988, metro final edition, at BI (reporting on a couple accused of attempting to sell their newborn daughter to undercover Maryland state troopers); The Market
for Babies, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 22, 1989 (Editorial), at 20; Karen Stabiner,
The Baby Brokers; in the Emotional World of Private Adoptions, the Lawyers Make the
Deals Between Childless Couples and Women Who Give Up Their Babies, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1988, Sun. home edition (Magazine), at 8; Two Face Baby-Selling Charge, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1988, § B, at 13 (noting that the parents of a two-month-old male infant
were charged with selling their son for $3,500 and three ounces of uncut cocaine). Four
people, including a father-and-daughter team of lawyers, were arrested for allegedly operating a baby-selling ring that charged as much as $36,000 for an infant. Barbara Whitaker, Adoption Agency as Baby Sellers, NEWSDAY (New York), June 21, 1989, city edition,
at 7. The four were charged with enticing prospective adoptive couples into paying large
fees and supposed expenses of the birth mothers so that they could obtain an infant more
quickly. Id.
11. See MEEZAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 77.
112. LAURIE WISHARD & WILLIAM R. WISHARD, ADOPTION: THE GRAFTED TREE
105 (1979).
113. Id.
114. Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 324 (1987) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Baby Shortage
Economics]; see CYNTHIA MARTIN, BEATING THE ADOPTION GAME (1980); Richard A.
Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987) [hereinafter Posner, Adoption Market Regulation].
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term which Posner has not disputed.1 15
In essence, the baby-selling article develops:
a model of supply and demand for babies for adoption under the
existing pattern of regulation and shows (1) how that regulation
has created a baby shortage (and, as a result, a black market) by
preventing a free market from equilibrating the demand for and
supply of babies for adoption and (2) how it has contributed to a
glut of unadopted children maintained in foster homes at public

expense.

16

Under this model, the price of a child would be determined by
factors such as a birth mother's direct and opportunity costs in
carrying the child to term, and any psychic costs she incurs by
giving birth to a child she will not keep, divided by the direct, opportunity, and psychological costs of either having and keeping the
child, or of aborting the child."I7
Posner and Landes, his co-author, list the major items for which
birth mothers are not currently compensated that would become
18
part of the allowable costs of "producing and selling a baby."'
These items include:
(1) the opportunity costs of the natural mother's time during the
period of pregnancy or hospitalization when she is precluded
from working, over and above her maintenance costs, (2) any
pain or other disutility of the pregnancy and delivery to her, (3)
any value which she attaches to keeping the child rather than
putting it up for adoption, and (4) the costs of search of the middleman-usually an obstetrician or lawyer-in locating and
bringing together the supplier and demander." 9
Ultimately, Posner and Landes propose the authorization of designated adoption agencies, on an experimental basis, to use a portion
of their adoption fees to pay women contemplating abortion to
forego the abortion, have the child, and then relinquish it for
20
adoption.
There has been considerable criticism of the Landes and Posner
article. 12 1 To help the reader understand their reasoning, the authors employ an economic analysis in which they analogize the sale
of infants to commodities such as automobiles and television
115. Posner, Adoption Market Regulation, supra note 114, at 59.
116. Landes & Posner, Baby Shortage Economics, supra note 114, at 324.
117. Id. at 329.
118. Id. at 337-39.
119. Id. at 337.
120. Id. at 347-48.
121. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text; see also Posner, Adoption Market
Regulation, supra note 114, at 59 (responding to critics).
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sets.122 A common criticism of this law-and-economic analysis is
its comparison of infants to ordinary commodities. 123 Other criticisms of the Posner and Landes proposal include a concern that
children sold on an open market would go to the highest bidder
and therefore to the wealthiest families, that there would be no
consideration of the best interests of the child in the sale, that such
a system would permit slavery, and that it would allow baby
breeding.124
In 1987, Posner responded to criticisms of the first baby-selling
article. 25 He stated that two common misconceptions about his
article were that he advocated a free market for babies, and that his
proposal to legalize the black market was a radical break with ex26
isting ethical norms. 1

In responding to his critics, Posner asserted that the money currently paid to birth mothers is really a sale in disguise. 27 In other
words, the gray market is really a black market incognito. Posner
also stated that the price of babies would not be driven up because
prices in a free market normally are lower than those in a black
market. 2 He reiterated that buyers would not be free to abuse
children because the laws forbidding the abuse and neglect of children would remain in effect.129 Posner, however, would limit remedies for breach of contract in the adoption area. 130 Posner's main
rationalization for his proposal is that he believes it will curtail the
number of abortions.' 3 ' Finally, Posner seems to imply that baby
selling does not equate with slavery because the children will be
sold into families that will care for them, and that perhaps, baby
122. Posner, Adoption Market Regulation, supra note 114, at 64; see JONATHAN
SwIFr, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS (1726) (as an example of another author who analogized
infants to commodities (potatoes)).
123. See Ronald A. Cass, Coping with Life, Law, and Markets: A Comment on Posner and the Law-and-Economics Debate, 67 B.U. L. REV. 73 (1987).
124. See id.; Jane M. Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L. REV. 105
(1987) (responding to Posner's "baby-selling article").
125. See Posner, Adoption Market Regulation, supra note 114, at 59-71.
126. Id. at 59-60.
127. Id. at 71.
128. Id. at 64-65.
129. Id. at 65-67 ("The idea that a significant number of people are lurking about
who if given the chance would buy babies for criminal purposes is a bogeyman.").
130. Id. at 67. Apparently even Posner would draw the line in breach of contract
cases. For example, Posner explains that adoptive parents could not reject a baby because of a handicap. Id. Nor would adoptive parents be able to force a birth mother to
surrender her baby if she changed her mind, unless a competent authority found that it
would be in the child's best interest to be with the adoptive parents. Id. Additionally, the
birth mother would not be allowed to take the baby back after adoption. Id.
131. Id. at 62-63.
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breeding should be permitted for couples32 who are unable to have
1
children for medical or genetic reasons.

Posner proposes implementing his scheme initially by allowing
agencies to induce pregnant women who have decided to abort, not
to do so through the payment of money."' a Posner's proposal differs greatly from this Article's proposal which only would allow
pregnant women, who have already made a decision to relinquish
their child for adoption, to receive compensation for certain expenses while they await the birth of their child. Thus, a critical
difference between Posner's proposal and this Article's proposal is
the focus on when and why the offer of compensation occurs in
relation to the decision to surrender a child.
This author's proposal, unlike the Landes and Posner proposal,
does not allow a party to promise money to a birth mother to entice her to change the decision she has made regarding her unwanted pregnancy. In addition, this author's proposal would not
compensate a birth mother for pain or for other disutility costs
relating to the pregnancy and birth of the child, would not place a
value on what it costs the birth mother to relinquish the child as
opposed to keeping it, and would not allow the middle person to
receive significant search costs.
The overriding problem with the Landes and Posner proposal is
that it exploits women. Money is offered to pregnant women who
have decided to have an abortion to forego the abortion, give birth,
and place the child for adoption. The sole intent behind the offer
of money is to influence a woman's decision regarding her pregnancy. The next logical step is to attempt to influence pregnant
women who have decided to keep their children instead to relinquish their babies for adoption, with the promise of money and
material gain. Obviously, in this scenario, only poor women would
need to sell their children. Women with sufficient income would
not be relegated to making these kinds of decisions.
It is arguable that there is very little difference between Posner's
proposal and prostitution. Essentially, a woman with an unwanted
pregnancy is allowing others to use her body for purely economic
reasons.' 34 This proposal exploits women and their reproductive
capacity.
132.

See id. at 70-71.

133. Id. at 63-64.
134. This can be distinguished from the surrogate mother situation where a woman
makes a decision to accept money before voluntarily becoming pregnant, and the other
party involved is the birth father.
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Although it may be true that some mothers are going to sell
their infants, this is undoubtedly only a small part of the black
market. The real culprit is the middle-person, for whom Posner
advocates a sizeable role, a middle-person who becomes involved
in the situation for the sole purpose of making a profit. 135 Mothers
entangled in baby marketing schemes generally are victims exploited by a middle-person. 36 Many authors and child welfare extype of activity
perts predict that authorities cannot control 1this
37
until the applicable laws are strictly enforced.
Further, several recently reported incidents of baby selling involve mothers and fathers selling their infants for money and
drugs. 38 These incidents suggest an increase in poverty and the
drug problem, which should be remedied through the enforcement
of drug laws and the rehabilitation of drug addicts, not by restricting compensation for birth mothers.
At least one commentator has suggested that states may discourage the black market in children by requiring the disclosure of expenses in adoption proceedings. 39 A number of statutory schemes
limit the purposes for which money may be spent in connection
with adoptions." 4° Statutes, however, that attempt to restrict the
actual quantitative amount of compensation exchanged in adoption
cases are largely ineffective. 4 '
As a consequence, there is a delicate balance between properly
compensating birth mothers for their labor and expenses, and cre135. See Julie Johnson, Baby Brokering: Desperate Girls' Case Reveals Shadowy
World, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1987, at Bi (reporting that pregnant teenage girls, attracted
by the offer of round trip air fare, spending money, a maternity wardrobe, and coverage
of all medical costs, were allegedly exploited by a man who arranged to have their infants
adopted for a fee and then kept the fee for himself); see also Wallisch, supra note 60
(discussing regulation of the middle-person).
136. Johnson, supra note 135, at B1.
137. See Tegeler, supra note 1, at 143-47. Enforcement of anti-baby-selling laws is
very difficult and perhaps impossible without the support of the parties involved in the
adoption; such support is difficult to obtain when it is counter to their interests. See id.;
Myers, supra note 60, at 629; Turano, supra note 13, at 60-61.
138. Lisa Leff, Maryland FamilyAdopted "Sold" Baby; Girl Found Healthy in "Good
Home," WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1988, at D6. The birth parents were arrested for allegedly giving an undercover officer their seven-week-old son in exchange for $3,500 and
three ounces of cocaine. Id. There were also allegations that the couple had earlier relinquished an infant daughter for $5,000. Id.; see supra note 110.
139. Paul T. Fullerton, Independent Adoption: The Inadequacies of State Law, 63
WASH. U. L.Q. 753, 763 (1985).
140. Wallisch, supra note 60, at 350 n.182. These include restrictions on fees
charged, mandatory court approval of the fees charged, an accounting report of all disbursements of any value made in connection with the adoption, and a requirement of
court approval of reasonable attorney fees. Id. at 350 nn.182-85.
141. Id. at 351.
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ating a wholesale baby market. Compensating birth mothers is not
baby selling. On the contrary, birth mothers should indeed be
compensated, but it is unnecessary to go further and create the
baby-selling market that Landes and Posner support.
III.

AN ANALYSIS OF COMPENSATION TO BIRTH MOTHERS

The parties to an adoption may exchange money in the following
situations: (1) where the parties to an adoption are unrelated and
generally are strangers; (2) where the exchange of money is between family members; 14 2 and (3) where the adoption involves surrogate mothers.143 This Article, which focuses on exchanges of
money between adoptive parents and unrelated birth mothers, discusses the current limitations on compensation to birth mothers
and the modifications that should be made to enhance this system.
Therefore, it is first necessary to consider how the various states
handle compensation for birth mothers who are relinquishing their
children for adoption.
A.

State Laws Governing Birth Mother Compensation'"

A critical disparity exists among state adoption laws concerning
142. Enders v. Enders, 30 A. 129 (Pa. 1894) (holding that an agreement to pay a
daughter-in-law $20,000 and her son $10,000 when the son comes of age in exchange for
the boy living with and being educated by his grandfather is not against public policy and
will be enforced); see also Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.
1975) (finding that an agreement by a father to provide for a mother of an illegitimate
child in the putative father's will in exchange for an agreement to permit the adoption of
the child by its father is enforceable because it does not violate public policy). But see
Willey v. Lawton, 132 N.E.2d 34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956) (holding that an offer by a birth
mother and her husband to the birth father that they would agree to adopt his children
for $5,000 so that the birth father would not have to pay future child support was an
illegal contract which was void as against public policy and not enforceable).
143. Barbara L. Atwell, Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of Incompatibility, 20
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988). Atwell notes that "A 'surrogate parenting
agreement' is an agreement in which the surrogate agrees for a fee to be impregnated
through artificial insemination, to carry the child to term, and, after birth, to deliver the
newborn baby to the biological father and to surrender all parental rights she would
otherwise have." Id. Atwell analyzes surrogate motherhood as an attempt to create a
new form of independent adoption and suggests that such agreements should not be enforced to the extent that they are incompatible with adoption statutes. Id.; see also Avi
Katz, SurrogateMotherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
1 (1986) (discussing and comparing the surrogate mother laws and the baby-selling laws);
John J. Mandler, Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform Surrogate ParenthoodAct, 73 GEO. L.J. 1283 (1985) (discussing the criticisms of
surrogate motherhood relating to the similarities between baby selling and surrogate
parenthood arrangements).
144. For purposes of this Article, compensation refers to any payment of money
made to a birth mother in connection with the adoption of her child, including but not
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compensation to birth mothers. For example, some birth mothers
who release their children for adoption receive compensation for
all expenses during their pregnancies, while other birth mothers
are relegated to meeting their needs through the welfare system.
Obviously, there is a need for consistency and reform in the adoption laws to stem the disparate treatment afforded to birth mothers
on a state-by-state basis.
Unfortunately, the states lack uniformity in their adoption laws
concerning the type and amount of compensation a birth mother
may receive."' Some states specifically allow a birth mother to
limited to, living expenses, medical costs, legal costs, counseling costs, attorney fees, and
other reasonable costs.
145. Linda Jean Davie, Note, Babes and Barristers: Legal Ethics and Lawyer-Facilitated Independent Adoptions, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 933, 940 (1984).
Many state statutes allow birth mothers to recover reasonable expenses incident to
maternity. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114 (1989) (a person shall not receive, directly
nor indirectly, anything of value in exchange for giving or obtaining consent to place a
child in an adoptive home, except in regard to reasonable medical and legal costs as well
as counselling and agency fees); IOWA CODE § 600.9 (1981) ("a natural parent shall not
receive anything of value as a result of the natural parent's child or former child being
placed with and adopted by another person," except as for expenses relating to the natural mother's child raising, childbirth, or delivery of the child for adoption); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:424.2 (West 1965 & Supp. 1991) (reimbursement payments made by the
adoptive parents to the birth mother are permissible for medical expenses, reasonable
administrative and agency expenses and foster care expenses); MD. FAM. LAW. CODE
ANN. § 5-327 (1984) (an agency or individual may not charge or receive compensation
for adoption placement, except for "reasonable and customary charges or fees for hospital or medical or legal services"); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.10 (Anderson 1989) (a
filing for adoption shall not state that there will be disbursements in connection with
placing of the child for adoption, except for physician expenses, hospital expenses, attorneys' fees, and agency expenses); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (1990) ("any person,
while having custody, care, control, or possession of any child, who sells any child for
consideration of the payment of money or other things of value is guilty of a felony of the
third degree, except costs for medical, hospital and legal services"); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 948.24 (West 1990) (it is illegal to be involved in an adoption where expenses exceeding
the "actual costs of the hospital and medical expenses of the mother and child" are
spent).
Other state statutes allow the birth mother to recover only that amount a court determines is reasonable. ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1986), repealed by 1990 ALA. AcTS 90-554,
§ 38 (effective Jan. 1, 1991) (it shall be unlawful to "hold out inducements to parents to
part with their offspring ... except through the commitment of a court having jurisdiction"); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090 (1983) (a petitioner in any proceeding for the adoption
of a minor shall file a report showing any expenses incurred in connection with the adoption); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-211 (Michie 1991) (in any proceeding for an adoption, a
report must be filed listing all disbursements of anything of value in connection with the
adoption); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-213 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990) (no person

shall pay or be paid anything of value in connection with an adoption, except attorneys
fees and other fees approved by the court); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (West
1986 & Supp. 1990) ("except for charges and fees approved by the court" no person shall
accept or receive any compensation in relation to adoption); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-50
(Michie 1989) (a petitioner in an adoption case must file a full accounting of everything
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receive compensation for living expenses.'" Others do not define
by law the amount or type of compensation that a birth mother
paid in connection with the adoption); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4.2 (1984)
(offering, giving, or receiving unauthorized consideration for adoption is a felony, except
for money which is expended with the court's approval).
Other state statutes prohibit or criminalize the birth mother's or a third party's receipt
of any compensation in exchange for a consent to adopt. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West
1989 & Supp. 1991) (any person who pays money or anything of value "to a parent for
the placement for adoption, for the consent to an adoption, or for cooperation in the
completion of the adoption" is guilty of a misdemeanor); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928
(1981) (no natural parent of any child who is being placed for adoption shall receive a fee
of any type in connection with the placement of the child or with the adoption); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 63.212(l)(d) (West 1985) (it is unlawful for any person "to sell or surrender, or to arrange for the sale or surrender of, a child to another person for money or
anything of value"); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-24 (Michie 1981) (it is unlawful for any
person to hold out inducements to a birth parent to give up his or her child); IDAHO
CODE § 18-1511 (1987) (it is illegal for any person to "sell or barter any child for adoption"); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1526 (1989) (no person, agency, etc. shall pay or be
paid any compensation for placing out a child for adoption, except "a child welfare
agency"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (Burns 1985) (it is a class D felony to "transfer
S.. or receive...
any property in connection with the waiver of parental rights, the
termination of parental rights, the consent to adoption or the petition for adoption"); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Baldwin 1982 & Supp. 1990) (no person shall "sell or
purchase" any child for the purpose of adoption); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 1 A
(Law. Co-op. 1987) (any person will be punished for accepting "payment in the form of
money or other consideration in return for placing a child for adoption"); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 568.175 (1979 & Supp. 1991) (a person commits the offense of trafficking when
that person offers or receives money,. or any other type of consideration, for the delivery
of a child from one person to another, or for the execution of the consent to adopt or to
terminate parental rights); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.290 (1986) (no person, who does not
operate a licensed child-placing agency, shall accept directly or indirectly any compensation for placing, arranging or assisting in arranging delivery of a child for adoption); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West 1976 & Supp. 1990) (no person shall receive any type of
compensation for "offering to make or assisting or participating in any placement for
adoption"); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1983) (no person shall pay or
give to any person any compensation in connection with placing a child out for adoption);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (1984) (no person shall give or accept, any fee or other compensation for receiving or placing any child for adoption); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.311(3)
(1990) (no person shall charge, accept, or pay another person to adopt a minor child,
except for fees involved in locating a child and fees charged by licensed adoption agencies); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-135 (1984) ("it is unlawful for any person," other: than
an adoption agency, to charge or receive any compensation or thing of value whatsoever
in connection with the placement of a child for adoption); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 25.11 (West 1989) ("a person commits an offense if he ... offers to accept, agrees to
accept, or accepts a thing of value for the delivery of a child to another.., for purposes of
adoption"); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-220.4 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1990) (no person shall
give or accept "any money, property, service or other thing of value in connection with a
placement or adoption"); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-16 (1986 & Supp. 1991) ("any person
who knowingly gives to another person any thing of value in consideration for the recipient's locating, providing, or procuring a minor child for, but not limited to, adoption" is
guilty of a misdemeanor offense).
146. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (l)(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-135 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (1990).
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may receive, 147 and still others limit compensation to either medical, legal, counseling, or other reasonable costs. 4 ' Furthermore,
no uniform definition of reimbursable expenses exists. Nevertheless, most states mandate that all payments must be reported to the
court. 41

9

Laws that prohibit or limit the receipt of compensation by birth
mothers presumably protect the birth mother from being coerced
into consenting to the adoption of her child.' 50 In reality, however,
this refusal to permit compensation to birth mothers for medical,
legal, counseling, living, and other costs that birth mothers reasonably need to live comfortably during their pregnancies is based on
archaic paternalistic assumptions that will be shown to lack
validity. 15
B.

The Two-Tiered Test-A JudicialAnalysis of Compensation
for Birth Mothers

In addition to state statutes regulating compensation for birth
mothers, several states' courts have adopted a two-tiered approach
to determine the proper compensation to be afforded to birth
mothers. 52 To apply this two-tiered analysis, a court must first
147. See MEEZAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 188-98. For example, the adoption statutes of Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming do not address the
issue of compensation for birth mothers. Id.
148. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114
(1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-211 (Michie 1991); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West 1989
& Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-213 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-24 (Michie 1991); IDAHO
CODE § 18-1511 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (Bums 1985); IOWA CODE
§ 600.9 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:424.2 (West 1965 & Supp. 1991); MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 5-327 (1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 568.175 (1979 & Supp. 1991); N.Y.
SOC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.11 (West
1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-220.4 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-416 (1986 & Supp. 1991).
149. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE
§ 600.9 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-7-50 (Michie 1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.10 (Anderson
1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.311(3) (1990).
150. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Infant Girl Banda, 559 N.E.2d 1373 (Ohio Ct. App.
1988). According to the court, the purpose of a statute which limits certain expenditures
in an adoption case is:
to protect both the mother and her baby from falling prey to a person involved
in the black market baby business. The fear is that financial incentive in the
transfer of a child will cause a mother to make a decision that is not in the best
interest of herself or the child.
Id. at 1380.
151. This is not a concession that these types of limitations were ever valid.
152. See Downs v. Wortman, 185 S.E.2d 387 (Ga. 1971); Savannah Bank & Trust
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decide who the beneficiaries are to an adoption contract. Is it the
adoptive parents, the birth parents, the child to be adopted, or a
combination of any of the three? For instance, financially assisting
a birth mother to enable her to leave the state after the birth of her
child is not acceptable because the mother, not the child, receives
the benefit.1 3 Once this determination is made, the court can then
decide whether the compensation was legitimate, and hence,
allowable.
Since it provides the clearest articulation of the two-tiered analysis, this Article will discuss the Pennsylvania case of Gorden v. Cutler. "54
' In Gorden, the Pennsylvania Superior Court' 55 adopted a
two-tiered approach for analyzing the legality of money exchanges
between parties to an adoption." 6 In Gorden, the adoptive parents
sought to adopt an infant through an independent adoption. 5 '
Through their attorney, the adoptive parents contacted the birth
mother and father.' 8 The adoptive parents agreed to pay the birth
mother's medical expenses'5 9 on the condition that the birth parents execute a consent to the adoption.160 In return for the adoptive parents' promise to pay the "lying in" expenses,' 6' the birth
Co. v. Hanley, 65 S.E.2d 26 (Ga. 1951); Gray v. Maxwell, 293 N.W.2d 90 (Neb. 1980);
Barwin v. Reidy, 307 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1957); Gorden v. Cutler, 471 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1983).
Thus, the reasoning in Gorden v. Cutler, to be discussed below, is not endemic to
Pennsylvania, as illustrated by the other courts that have chosen to use this same model.
Moreover, states that have not judicially adopted the two-tiered test as applied in Gorden use similar statutory guidelines to assess the legality of compensation for a birth
mother where they limit reimbursable expenses to those connected with the birth of the
child. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090 (1983) (limiting compensation to medical or
hospital care received by the mother or minor during the mother's prenatal care or confinement); IOWA CODE § 600.9 (1981) (limiting compensation to an amount commensurate with necessary services provided to the birth mother relating to child birth, child
raising, or delivery of the child for adoption).
153. See Downs v. Wortman, 185 S.E.2d 387, 388 (Ga. 1971).
154. Gorden v. Cutler, 471 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). Gorden represents the
prevailing belief in our society that equates the exchange of money in adoption cases with
baby selling.
155. The Pennsylvania Superior Court is an intermediate appellate court of
Pennsylvania.
156. Gorden, 471 A.2d at 458. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later applied
the two-tiered approach in In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925 (Pa. 1986), this Article first
examines Gorden because of its clarity.
157. Gorden, 471 A.2d at 450.
158. Id.
159. The estimated cost of the birth mother's expenses was $3,000, which included
medication and treatment in the hospital, doctor's fees, a sonogram, an ultrasound test,
the delivery, prenatal care, blood work, and circumcision of the infant. Id.
160. Id.
161. Lying-in expenses are those expenses directly connected to the birth of a child.
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parents agreed to consent to the adoption of their unborn child. 62
Thereafter, the adoptive parents expended approximately $3,000 to
cover the birth mother's expenses. 63 After payment of these ex64
penses, the adoptive parents received custody of the infant boy.
Prior to the filing of a Petition for Adoption by the adoptive
parents, the birth parents filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus seeking the return of their child. 165 After a hearing, the
trial court ordered the adoptive parents to return the infant to the
custody of his birth parents. 66 The court made no provision for
the repayment of the adoption-related expenditures to the adoptive
parents.167 Consequently, the 6adoptive parents filed suit for reimbursement of these expenses.

Though the trial court held it lacked jurisdiction to decide the
case, it opined that, if given an opportunity to reach a decision, it
would deny the adoptive parents' request to recoup their expenses
from the birth parents.169 The court explained that it would base
its denial for reimbursement on its belief that a contract to pay
expenses in exchange for a consent to adopt is void as a matter of
law because it violates public policy. 70 The court voiced its concern that the necessary corollary to the adoptive parents' argument
would be that payment of medical bills would entitle a payor to
have custody of the child; such an agreement, the court stated, cannot be judicially enforced.' 7
Although reversing on a jurisdictional issue, 7 2 the appellate
court in Gorden nevertheless reached the merits of the case. The
court found the real issue to be whether the Pennsylvania courts
would enforce an adoption contract. To answer this question, the
Gorden court first had to determine whether a contract for adoption violates public policy. 7 3 The Pennsylvania adoption statute
162. Gorden, 471 A.2d at 450.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. Custody was not an issue on appeal. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 450-51.
169. Id. at 452.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 452-53. The court explained that Pennsylvania had recently unified its
court system to simplify procedures and to remove archaisms from the judicial system.
Id. As a result, a case could no longer be dismissed simply because it was in the wrong
court; instead the proper remedy would be to transfer the case to the correct division. Id.
The court thus held that the trial court improperly dismissed the case.
173. Id. at 454. The court noted that the agreement to adopt is a contract, and there-
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involved,' 74 like many other state statutes,' does not proscribe
any specific fees in adoptions. Rather, the adopting parents must
submit all payments76made in connection with an adoption to the
court for approval.
Thus, because the Pennsylvania statute did not prohibit adoption contracts expressly, the Gorden court held that a court must
determine that the adoption contract injured the public or worked
against the public good in order to declare such an arrangement
void as against public policy. 77 Specifically, in the adoption context, the court must consider whether the questioned contract benefits the child. 78 Once the court determines that the contract
benefits the child, the court then must review the terms of the contract and the facts of each case to see if the contract violates public
policy.
To further this analysis, the Gorden court next adopted and employed a two-tiered test, 179 first articulated by the Supreme Court
fore, the court's task was to elucidate a definition of "public policy" regarding such contracts. Id. at 455. Public policy is an ever-changing term. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Long, 564 A.2d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appealgranted, 582 A.2d 323 (Pa. 1990)
(noting that the courts have rarely articulated a definition of "public policy" and when
they have, the meaning is vague and variable; the only constant of public policy being
that it is never constant). The Gorden court stated:
Public policy, in the administration of the law by the courts, is essentially different from what may be public policy in the view of the legislature.... The public
policy which dictates the enactment of a law is determined by the wisdom of the
legislature. If the legislature declared by statute, that it was injurious to public
interests, under any circumstances, for a parent to surrender the custody of a
child during minority to a grandfather, that would be the end of discussion on
that question... . But in the absence of any statute forbidding such a contract,
• , . we must find, as a fact, that such contracts to be void, have a tendency to
injure the public, or are against the public good.
Gorden, 471 A.2d at 455 (quoting Enders v. Enders, 30 A. 129, 129 (Pa. 1894)).
174. Adoption Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 2101-2910 (1990).
175. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:424.2 (West 1965 & Supp. 1991); see statutes
cited supra note 149.
176. Adoption Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2533(b)(8), (c) (1990) (requiring an
itemized accounting of money and consideration to be paid to or received by an intermediary or to or by any other person or persons to the knowledge of the intermediary by
reason of the adoption placement).
177. Gorden, 471 A.2d at 455 (citing Enders, 30 A. at 129).
178. A child is clearly not chattel and cannot be bought and sold. Knight v. Deavers,
531 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Ark. 1976). In a contested adoption, the Knight court awarded
custody of a child to foster parents, despite a written agreement by the foster parents that
they would not try to gain legal custody of the child. Id. at 253. The court stated that a
child is not chattel and that no one has a proprietary right in a child. Id. at 256.
179. See infra part V. The court refers to this test as two-tiered, presumably because
when examining the contract, two questions are posed. In reality, however, it is a simple
one-part test. A true two-tiered test will be proposed in the remedy section of this
Article.
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of Georgia in 1951'80 and later refined by that same court in
1971.181 The essence of this test is that a mother may not agree to
the adoption of her child by another in exchange for monetary consideration to herself because such an agreement is against public
policy and therefore void." 2 However, if the monetary consideration flows to the child and not "to the mother, the contract is not
against public policy.18 3 Other courts that apply this two-tiered
analysis' 84 today recognize that it is common for adopting parents
to pay the medical and hospital expenses of a birth mother, a benefit ultimately flowing to the child. 85 A blanket disallowance of
such payments would serve only to overburden an already taxed
social service system.
After reviewing the facts, the appellate court in Gorden found
that all of the money expended by the adoptive parents directly
benefitted the child and in no way inured to the benefit of the birth
mother.8 6 These payments covered expenses for the birth
mother's medication and treatment while hospitalized, an ultrasound test, prenatal care, blood work, the delivery of the baby, and
the baby's circumcision.18 7 Ultimately, the appellate court concluded that there was a valid contract and a wrongful breach by
180. Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Hanley, 65 S.E.2d 26, 29 (Ga. 1951) (holding
void an agreement which allowed adoption of a child in return for a bequest of property
because the benefit flowed to the birth mother and not to the child).
181. Downs v. Wortman, 185 S.E.2d 387 (Ga. 1971). The birth mother was given
plane fare in exchange for signing adoption papers. Id. at 388. The court held that this
type of consent was involuntary, and therefore the mother could withdraw her consent.
Id. The exchange was against public policy because the consideration flowed to the
mother and not to the child. Id.
182. Hanley, 65 S.E.2d at 29.
183. Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolff, II S.E.2d 766, 772-73 (Ga. 1940).
184. See, e.g., Barwin v. Reidy, 307 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1957). The Barwin court recognized that it is common for adopting parents to agree to pay certain hospital and medical
expenses for a birth mother and her child in anticipation of adoption. Id. at 184. The
court found that this type of agreement does not violate public policy because it advances
the welfare of the child by ensuring that the child and mother have adequate attention.
Id. Where, however, the child is released for adoption in consideration of a monetary
payment for the benefit of the parent, the consent is void. Id.; see also Gray v. Maxwell,
293 N.W.2d 90 (Neb. 1980). The Gray court adopted the reasoning of Barwin, holding
that it is not contrary to public policy for persons to make provisions for the hospital and
medical expenses of a birth mother. Gray, 293 N.W.2d at 95. However, a promise to pay
an amount in excess of legitimate expenses in exchange for a child renders the agreement
void as against public policy. Id.
185. In re Adoption of Baby Boy M.G., 522 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sur. Ct. 1987) (approving
all medical expenses and other expenses which related specifically to the adoption); see
Gray, 293 N.W.2d at 95.
186. Gorden v. Cutler, 471 A.2d 449, 458 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
187. Id. at 450-51.
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the birth parents.' 8 Accordingly, the appellate court held that the
birth parents were required to reimburse the adoptive parents. 8 9
Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had an opportunity
to apply Gorden's two-tiered test in Baby Girl D. 9 The Baby Girl
D. court reviewed the fees that six different adopting couples paid
to a single adoption agency for expenses incurred in locating, preparing, and arranging an adoption. The questioned fees covered
the agency's expenses for: (1) counseling birth mothers; (2) counseling adoptive parents; (3) advertising; (4) birth mothers' room,
board, and travel; (5) birth mothers' medical treatments not directly related to the birth of the children; and (6) agency fees.191
The court employed the two-tiered analysis to determine
whether to allow the payments. 192 Although the agency, not the
birth mother, received the actual payment of the fees, the court
stated that when using the two-tiered test, courts must inquire
whether the benefit of any adoption-related payment flowed directly to the child.' 93
Thus, pursuant to the two-tiered analysis, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court disallowed all of the fees under scrutiny. The court
first disallowed the agency's fees for counseling birth mothers on
the ground that any benefit inured directly to the birth mother and
that the only possible benefit to the child was indirect.' 94 Second,
the court used the same ground to deny charges for room and
board and expenses for transporting birth mothers from their
homes to the agency.' 95 Third, the court denied both the counseling fees for the adoptive parents and the agency fees. 196 Other disbursements that the court denied included medical expenses
188. Id. at 458.
189. Id. at 458-59. But see A.L. v. P.A., 517 A.2d 494 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1986). The court held that the birth parents were not liable for civil damages resulting
from their revocation of consent or opposition to the entry of an adoption order in a
private adoption agreement because it would have an improper chilling effect upon the
birth parents' exercise of their right to continue the parent-child relationship. Id.
190. In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925 (Pa. 1986). This decision illustrates rather
vividly the continuing confusion with the two-tiered test.
191. Id. at 926.
192. Id. at 927.
193. Id. at 927-28.
194. Id. at 928. The agency had argued that counseling fees should be permitted
because the stability induced by counseling benefits the child. Id.
195. Id. The adopting couples did not pay to house the birth mother of the infant
they were actually to adopt. Id. If they had, the court indicated that it would arguably
constitute an illegal payment to the mother in anticipation of the transfer of the child and
further it would bring the voluntariness of the mother's actions into question. Id.
196. Id. at 930. Agency fees based on a sliding scale are per se illegal because the
court could not conceive of any possible relationship between the costs of providing adop-
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wholly unrelated
to the birth,' 97 Lamaze classes, prenatal care, and
98
a sonogram.'
The court reasoned that the need for a limitation on fees is twofold. First, limitations on expenses ensure the placement of children in homes that promote their needs and welfare. 199 Second,
limitations on expenses ensure that children will not be bought and
sold.2 00 The court further reasoned that assistance directly benefitting a birth mother would "naturally tend to influence the mother's
decision whether to relinquish her parental rights." 20 ' The court
also feared that the type of indirect financial aid involved in the
Baby Girl D. case would trigger the infamous "slippery slope"
without prospects of an end. 2 The dissent questioned the propriety of formulating a per se rule requiring a direct benefit to a child
and posited that a definition of direct benefit would prove elusive
and produce anomalous results. 20 3 The dissenters preferred to approach the compensation issue on a case-by-case basis.2
The following comparison between the Gorden and Baby Girl D.
decisions illustrates the problem with the two-tiered test. The Gorden court found that all of the expenses paid by the adopting parents to the birth parents were allowable because they directly
benefitted the child. The fees specifically included services for an
ultrasound test and for prenatal care. 205 Yet, the Baby Girl D.
court, applying the same test, prohibited reimbursement of fees for
prenatal care, Lamaze classes, and a sonogram, explaining that
tion services and a couple's gross income. Id. The court viewed mandatory counseling
fees for adoptive parents as mere agency fees in disguise. Id.
197. In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925, 929 n.6 (Pa. 1986) (positing that the surgical
removal of a mass from a birth mother's breast is an example of this type of expense).
198. Id. at 929.
199. Id. at 926.
200. Id. at 927.
201. Id. at 929.
202. Id. For example, the Baby Girl D. court asked the following questions:
Are we then to sanction provision by adoptive parents of a halcyon environment and delectable foods for expectant mothers on the grounds these are beneficial to the child? If medical science were to determine that stress during
pregnancy is inimical to the fetus, and an expectant mother's employment was
causing her stress, would prospective adopters be expected to employ an agency
to find the mother a happier work environment, or perhaps simply support the
mother during her pregnancy lest the added stress inhibit the baby's development or effect his insufferable disposition? We think not.
Id.
203. Id. at 931 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting) ("So called indirect benefits, under certain
circumstances promote the needs and welfare of the child and may at times be essential to
its well-being.").
204. Id. at 933 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
205. Gorden v. Cutler, 471 A.2d 449, 451 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
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these expenses were not directly connected to the birth and did not
directly benefit the child. 2°
National statistics, however, tell a story different than that assumed by the Baby Girl D. court. Studies clearly show a direct
correlation between prenatal care and infant mortality.20 7 In fact,
the United States government, because of a concern for the lack of
prenatal care for pregnant mothers in impoverished communities,
is currently proposing a national health care plan that would provide prenatal care to all women. 2°8 Given these statistics, it is difficult to comprehend how a court could conclude that prenatal care
does not directly benefit a child. Furthermore, as the dissent noted
in Baby Girl D., indirect benefits under certain circumstances still
promote the needs and welfare of the child and, at times, may be
essential to a child's well being. 2° Consequently, Gorden and Baby
Girl D. illustrate the problems involved in arbitrarily applying the
two-tiered test with its corresponding emphasis upon the direct
benefits to the child.
C. Differing Approaches to Compensationfor Birth Mothers
As evidenced by the Gorden and Baby Girl D. cases above, many
state courts review the compensation to birth mothers in adoption
cases. Numerous states mandate the filing in court of a list of
adoption expenditures. 210 As a result, many courts have the opportunity to review these payments to determine which expenses are
206. Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d at 929. Fortunately, in response to the Baby Girl D.
decision, the Pennsylvania legislature specifically amended its adoption statute to allow
payments for certain expenses which relate to the birth of the child. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 2533(d) (1990).. The legislature, obviously concerned about this dichotomy,
amended the adoption statute specifically to allow payments of medical and hospital expenses for prenatal care; expenses incurred related to the birth of the child; medical,
hospital and foster care expenses on behalf of the child; and reasonable expenses for counseling. Id.
207. Paul H. Wise et al., Infant Mortality Increase Despite High Access to Tertiary
Care: An Evolving RelationshipAmong Infant Mortality, Health Care, and Socioeconomic
Change, PEDIATRICS, Apr. 1988, at 542.
208. Spencer Rich, U.S. Launches Campaign to Reduce Infant Mortality; Critics of
'Healthy Start' Contend 10-City PilotDrainsFunds From SimilarPrograms,WASH. POST,
Feb. 15, 1991, at A8; Large City Infant Mortality High, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1991, at
A17.
209. Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d at 934 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
210. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090 (1983) (a petitioner in any proceeding for
the adoption of a minor shall file a report showing any expenses incurred in connection
with the adoption); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-211 (Michie 1991) (in any proceeding for an
adoption, a report must be filed listing all disbursements of anything of value in connection with the adoption); see also supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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allowable. 21' As noted previously, however, there is no uniform
agreement among the states concerning which types of compensation should be allowed in the adoption context. 212 There is also a
difference of opinion within individual states' courts regarding the
correct definition of such terms as "reasonable expenses."
For example, New York surrogate courts, which are charged
with reviewing exchanges of money in adoption cases, are at odds
with each other concerning what expenses are properly reimbursable in adoption cases. The applicable New York statute allows
adoptive parents to reimburse birth parents for expenses in connection with "the birth or care of the adoptive child, the pregnancy or
care of the adoptive child's mother or the placement or adoption of
the child and on account of or incidental'21 to
assistance in arrange3
ments for such placement or adoption.
The compensation structure of the New York statute, at first
glance, appears more progressive than the two-tiered test. Yet
New York surrogate courts have interpreted it to interdict reimbursement of the following: (1) food and temporary living expenses for a birth mother both before and after the birth of the
child; 2 14 (2) living expenses for the maintenance of a birth mother's
home in another state while she resided in New York; 21 5 (3) travel
expenses; 2 6 and (4) agency fees. 2 7 To add to the confusion, at
least one New York surrogate court interpreted the statute to allow
reimbursement of living expenses for a birth mother.21 8 Clearly,
there is no accord among the New York courts in this matter.
Recently, the Illinois Appellate Court held that a $10,000 payment, purportedly to aid the birth mother to begin a new life, was
an illegal payment and thus, voided the birth mother's consent to
adoption. 2 9 But in New Jersey, an illegal payment did not void a
211. Courts, however, must rely upon the honesty of the parties and their attorneys
to file accurate reports. For example, an attorney was disciplined for omitting cash payments made by adoptive couples to physicians from the schedules of expenses filed with
the court in 21 private adoption cases. In re Nadler, 438 N.E.2d 198, 199 (Ill. 1982).
212. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
213. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 501 N.Y.S.2d 240, 242 (Sur. Ct. 1986) (quoting
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115(7) (McKinney 1985)).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. In re Adoption of Baby Boy, M.G., 522 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sur. Ct. 1987).
218. Id. at 823.
219. In re Adoption of Kindgren, 540 N.E.2d 485 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding payments of money in excess of the reasonable and actual medical expenses related to the
birth of the child void as against public policy).
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consent to an adoption where it was in the child's best interest.220
New Jersey appellate courts, however, hold that adoptive parents cannot expect that a legally tentative decision to privately
adopt a child will not be revoked. All investments of time, money,
and emotion must be understood against that principle. Thus,
adoptive parents cannot recover any out-of-pocket expenses spent
on an adoptive child while in their custody after the birth parents
breach the agreement and regain custody of their child.22 ' In conclusion, the lack of uniformity prevalent in state statutes governing
birth mother compensation is only further exacerbated by state
court interpretations of their respective state adoption statutes.
D.

The Relation Between Voluntary Consent and Compensation
in Adoption Cases

Ultimately, our society desires to ensure that birth parents who
relinquish their children for adoption are doing so voluntarily and
free from duress or coercion.222 Many believe that receiving compensation will influence a birth mother's decision whether to relinquish her child for adoption. Accordingly, this is the rationale
used
for refusing to allow a birth mother to receive a direct benefit.223 This rationale appears to underlie all limitations on receipt
of compensation by birth mothers who relinquish their children for
adoption. Therefore, the voluntariness of the birth mother's decision is of vital importance to the issue of compensation.
Historically, the courts decided the voluntariness issue by focusing on the presence or absence of duress or fraud in the decisionmaking process. Although courts today often look at a combination of factors when trying to ascertain whether a consent is voluntary, they seem to view attempts to withdraw consent with a
jaundiced eye. Once a consent is given, courts apparently desire to
give effect to such a consent.
For example, one court has held that a combination of the following factors do not constitute duress and, therefore, do not vitiate a birth mother's consent to the adoption of her child:
220. In re Adoption of a Child by I.T., 397 A.2d 341 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978) (holding that an adoption was valid because it was in the best interest of the child
even though the adoptive parents clearly violated the law and involved themselves in an
illegal adoptive placement).
221. A.L. v. P.A., 517 A.2d 494, 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
222. See Huebert v. Marshall, 270 N.E.2d 464 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (holding that
consent to adoption obtained by duress or coercion is void ab initio and therefore should
be set aside).
223. See supra part III.B.
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depression; weakness from recent childbirth; confusion caused by
heavy medication; pressure by an official of a birth mother's
church; pressure by an attorney representing the adoptive parents;
and misinformation to the birth mother regarding the finality of
her signature .2 4 The same court specifically noted that "the fact

that [the birth mother] was weakened by her recent delivery and
depressed, as all women would be under similar circumstances,
does not constitute duress.

'225

Thus, it has been found that these

circumstances would not unduly influence a birth mother's decision to surrender her child for adoption.
The Illinois courts have had the opportunity to review the consent in adoption cases many times over the past 30 years and their
decisions are representative of similar cases from around the country. One Illinois appellate court held that an illegal $200 payment
to a birth mother from the adopting parents would not necessarily
vitiate a birth mother's consent.226 Thus, the exchange of money in
an adoption case is not always so suspect that it invalidates the
consent.
Whether a consent is voluntary is often difficult to ascertain; the
courts must consider an adoption situation in its entirety.227 In
addition, prior case law is not always helpful because courts must
review each situation on a case-by-case basis, and the cases often
present inconsistent results. For example, pressure by parents of a
teenage, unwed mother to relinquish her child may constitute duress. 228 Parents may not permissibly condition their parental love
and the fulfillment of their legal obligation to support their daughter during her minority on her consent to an adoption. 229 Further,

the payment of money in excess of the reasonable and actual medical expenses of the birth of a child also may vitiate the consent to
adoption because it is void as against public policy. 230 Other
224. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 530 P.2d 896, 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
225. Id. at 898.
226. Cohen v. Janic, 207 N.E.2d 89, 92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (noting that the proper
sanction for an illegal payment is found in the criminal laws and not in the adoption act).
227. See Huebert v. Marshall, 270 N.E.2d 464, 467 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971). The Huebert
court recognized "moral duress" where an alleged friend of a birth mother convinced her
to relinquish her child for adoption. It was later shown that this "friend" was having an
affair with the birth father and had made plans to meet him in another state after he left
his wife. Id.
228. In re Sims, 332 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Il1. App. Ct. 1975).
229. Id.
230. In re Adoption of Kindgren, 540 N.E.2d 485, 485 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). In Kindgren, adoptive parents paid a birth mother $1,000 to cover her medical expenses, without seeing any bills. Id. at 488-89. Additionally, the mother of the adoptive mother paid
the birth mother an additional $9,000 to help her start a new life. Id. at 487. The court
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courts, however, have concluded that environmental stress and
haste do not necessarily equal duress negating a mother's consent
to adopt. 3 In fact, courts have found a birth mother's consent
voluntary even in cases evidencing that extenuating circumstances
influenced her decision to consent to the adoption of her child.2 32
Accordingly, while the Illinois Supreme Court has refused to
recognize "environmental stress" as a factor affecting consent,233
the Missouri courts have countenanced that there is a "somewhat
indefinite and shadowy border area which for want of better words
can be called duress 'by force of circumstances' " in adoption
cases. 234 Therefore, depending upon state law, "force of circumstances" may or may not affect a birth mother's consent.
One situation in which the "force of circumstances" may complicate a finding of voluntary consent involves transnational adoptions. Because of the shortage of children available for adoption,
there has been an increase in the number of transnational adoptions within the past ten years.2 3 5 Many courts closely scrutinize
these types of adoptions. For instance, a New Jersey couple, acting
through an unapproved and unlicensed agency, retained an attorney from Chile to assist them in securing a Chilean child for adopheld that this exchange of money voided the consent to adoption because it was against
public policy. Id. at 489.
231. Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 858 (Ill. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435
U.S. 963 (1978). In Regenold, a 19-year-old mother contacted and visited a child welfare
agency, signed a consent to release her child for adoption, and surrendered custody of her
child to the agency. Id. at 860-62. Four days later, after speaking with friends, she began
proceedings to withdraw her consent. Id. at 862. At the time of the placement, the
mother was under a great deal of stress. Id. at 860-61. After being divorced for only one
month, she found herself living with her parents who constantly argued and were in the
process of obtaining a divorce, disagreeing with her mother on the rearing of her threeyear-old brother, facing financial difficulties, and taking medication. Id. According to
the court, this type of environmental stress, however, did not amount to the duress which
is necessary to vitiate a consent to the adoption of one's child. Id. at 865.
232. In re Surrender of Minor Children, 181 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1962). In this case, a
pregnant, unmarried mother with an IQ of 60 and four children was in jail, awaiting trial,
and had no relatives to help her take care of her children. Id. at 836-37. A social worker
encouraged her to relinquish her children by reminding her of the possible length of her
jail sentence. Id. The court held that the mother voluntarily consented to the adoption
of her children and stated that the mother consented with full understanding and was not
unduly influenced or distressed. Id. at 838-39.
233. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
234. In re Interest of G., 389 S.W.2d 63, 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (holding that where
a birth father induced the mother of a child to sign a consent for adoption by assuring her
that the grandmother would return the child whenever the birth father ceased his wanderings and secured employment, and where the birth mother at all times opposed the
adoption, the consent was not voluntary).
235. Carlson, supra note 89, at 317 & n.3.
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tion.236 In violation of a New Jersey statute, the adopting couple
expended approximately $5,000 in connection with receiving a
child for adoption. The appellate court noted that the legislative
intent behind the section of the adoption statute proscribing the
use of intermediaries was to prevent the trafficking in human lives
for profit as in the black market for babies.237 Interestingly,
although New Jersey forbids the use of intermediaries, if a child is
illegally placed for adoption, the statute does not thwart the finalI
ization of the adoption.23
Birth mothers will almost always consent to the adoption of
their children under circumstances that may cast doubt upon the
voluntariness or understanding of the consequences of the consent.239 In other words, this type of situation is inevitably difficult
and rarely will one find a birth mother gladly surrendering her
child for adoption. Despite this, it does not necessarily follow that
a woman is incapable of a well-thought-out decision in these matters. Although the situation may be very difficult and emotionally
charged, a birth mother is still capable of reaching a reasoned
decision.
A clear and compelling example of a mother being forced to
consent to an adoption against her will is the case of In re Hua.2 °
In that case, an unmarried Vietnamese mother and an AfricanAmerican soldier living in Vietnam had an out-of-wedlock daughter.24 I The birth father returned to the. United States.242 A social
welfare agency approached the mother on several occasions and
discussed the discrimination her child most likely would experi236. In re Adoption of a Child by N.P., 398 A.2d 937, 938-39 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1979).
237. Id. at 939.
238. In re Adoption of a Child by I.T., 397 A.2d 341, 344 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978). In Adoption of Child by I.T., adoptive parents violated the state adoption statute
by using international agents and large sums of money to obtain a child illegally, and
used their financial stability to "jump to the head of the line" of those couples waiting for
a placement by an approved agency. Id. at 343. The court declared that it could find no
evidence that the parents were unfit or that the adoption would not be in the best interests
of the child. Id. at 348. The court, therefore, held that the adoption was not void. Id.
Apparently, being dishonest and violating the law do not always render adoptive parents
unfit to care for a child.
239. People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 269 N.E.2d 787, 788
(N.Y.), cert. denied, sub nor. DeMartino v. Scarpetta, 404 U.S. 805 (1971). The court
noted that "[i]t is or should be obvious that the surrender of a child by its parent,
whatever the circumstances or reason, has elements of tragedy in it and that pain, feelings
of guilt, and suffering will not be avoided whatever course is taken." Id.
240. In re Hua, 405 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1980).
241. Id. at 256.
242. Id.
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ence in Vietnam because of the child's African-American heritage. 243 Those discussions, coupled with the escalating civil war in
Vietnam and the heavy bombardment of Da Nang, convinced the
mother to surrender her child. 24 The reviewing court held that
the welfare agency took advantage of the wartime circumstances
and the mother's fear that her life was in danger and played upon
this situation to induce the birth mother to relinquish her child for
adoption. 24 5 Accordingly, the court held that this consent was exe-

cuted under duress. In less clear circumstances, however, courts
have found that a birth mother's stress of financial and emotional
problems does not vitiate her consent to adopt her child. 2 6
When reviewing a decision by a birth mother to consent to the
adoption of her child, courts recognize that the situation is always
difficult. Courts acknowledge, however, that a woman, in dire financial straits and in the midst of many personal and emotional
problems, is nonetheless able to voluntarily consent to the adoption
of her child. Even though third parties may give advice to the
birth mother and influence her decision, courts rarely view this
type of influence as coercion. Since the courts have determined
that a woman can make a competent and voluntary decision under
such conditions, the legal community should accept such standards
of voluntariness as enunciated by the courts.
IV.

AN ANALYSIS OF LAWS RELATING TO COMPENSATION
FOR BIRTH MOTHERS -

As shown above, although state laws and court opinions vary,
the current trend prohibits birth mothers who are relinquishing
their babies for adoption from receiving anything except the most
meager compensation. There are two fundamental problems with
this position; one is the apparent misapplication of the rules, 24 7 and
the other is an erroneous theoretical foundation.
243. Id. at 257.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 259.
246. See McCurdy v. Albertina Kerr Homes, Inc., 498 P.2d 392, 395 (Or. Ct. App.
1972). Although the birth mother's father made her appointment with the adoption
agency, she was the one who initiated the events leading up to the eventual placement of
the child for adoption. Id. at 394-95. The McCurdy court held that stress of financial
and emotional problems is insufficient to show undue influence and invalidate a consent
to adoption. Id. at 395.
247. The misapplication of the rules has been previously illustrated in the discussion
of the two-tiered test and the comparison of differing state court decisions that interpret
identical rules differently. See supra part III.B-C. A proposal for a clearer, easier, and
fairer test is presented at the end of this Article. See infra part V.
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First, the disparity among state laws with respect to compensation for birth mothers encourages people who reside in states with
fairly restrictive rules regarding compensation for birth mothers to
relocate or to file adoption petitions in states with more lenient
laws. For example, when Louisiana adoption laws were particularly permissive regarding compensation for birth mothers, at least
one adoption agency reportedly recruited unwed pregnant women
from different states to live in Louisiana.248 In return for placing
their children for adoption through that agency, the women received air fare, maternity clothes, and living expenses.249 Moreover, after Baby Girl D. and its misapplication of the two-tiered
test, at least one Philadelphia attorney no longer accepts adoption
clients in Pennsylvania because he believes he can provide better
services for his clients if the adoption is completed in another
state.250 These inconsistencies again illustrate the need for uniform
adoption laws.25
Second, the present theory underlying our society's treatment of
compensation for birth mothers is erroneous. The rationale for
placing limitations on compensation is as follows. First, society
wants to discourage any profit motive in connection with adoptions. Society's concern with the profit motive relates to a desire to
eradicate the black market in children; society will not permit children to be bartered and sold like property.252 Second, society
wants to ensure that a birth mother's consent to the surrender of
her child for adoption is voluntary and not procured under
duress.253
248. See Johnson, supra note 135, at B1.
249. Id.
250. Interview with Bob Braun, Attorney, in Philadelphia, PA regarding his adoption law practice (Mar. 1990).
251. For articles urging the need for such uniform adoption laws, see sources cited
supra note 60.
252. See Gray v. Maxwell, 293 N.W.2d 90 (Neb. 1980) (holding that although it is
not against public policy for adopting parents to pay a birth mother's hospital and medical expenses, it is against public policy to relinquish a child in consideration of a promise
to pay a sum of money in excess of legitimate expenses); see also Adoption Hotline, Inc. v.
State, 385 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("The probable injury to the public
is evident in the obvious and immediate potential for a black-market-baby-sale network,
attendant with the improper and highly probable 'unsuitable' placements of children, in
violation of Florida law.") (citation omitted); In re Adoption of Kindgren, 540 N.E.2d
485, 485 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that a consent to adoption given in exchange for an
illegal payment of $10,000 renders a consent void as against public policy); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 143 N.Y.S.2d 90, 94 (App. Div. 1955) (holding that a birth mother
who places her child for adoption may not demand or accept any compensation except
for reasonable medical fees and hospital charges).
253. See In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925, 927 (Pa. 1986); see also supra part III.D.
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The current view assumes that whenever a birth mother receives
a benefit from her decision to relinquish her child for adoption, her
decision is the product of undue influence.254 Based on this supposition, case law emerged prohibiting birth mothers from accepting
any direct monetary benefits from the adoption process. This view
gives women very little credit. Although it is true that deciding to
relinquish an unwanted child for adoption is surely a very difficult
and painful experience, women generally are perfectly capable of
handling such a decision without allowing their wills to be overborne simply by the prospects of financial gain. 5 It is time to
abolish these paternalistic compensation laws.256 Refusing to allow
birth mothers reasonable compensation only serves to keep women
in a cage of poverty.
V.

THE REMEDIES

Our adoption system requires radical restructuring. Although
welfare experts have been calling for uniform adoption laws for
over forty years, inconsistency remains the rule. Not only are individual state statutes inconsistent, but state courts often disagree on
critical definitions contained within their own state adoption statutes. This Article makes several proposals for reformation of the
current adoption laws that will make the adoption system more
equitable. Suggested are liberalization of the statutes regulating
compensation for birth mothers; a mandatory counseling requirement for birth mothers who wish to receive compensation; recom254. See supra part III.B-C.
255. One of the concerns voiced by advocates of this position is that a woman could
not possibly voluntarily relinquish her child until after the birth of the child. This point
is debatable, but it can easily be resolved by not allowing a birth mother to give her
consent to the adoption until a certain number of days have passed after the birth of her
child.
256. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), Justice Brennan recognized the
problem of paternalistic laws stating:
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history
of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an
attitude of "romantic paternalism" which, in practical effect, put women, not
on a pedestal, but in a cage. Indeed this paternalistic attitude became so firmly
rooted in our national consciousness that, 100 years ago, a distinguished member of this court was able to proclaim "Man is, or should be, woman's protector
and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that
which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood."
Id. at 684 (quoting Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring)).
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mended counseling for adoptive parents; and completion of a home
study, preferably before a child's placement in an adoptive home,
but in any event no later than one week after placement of the
child. Additional suggestions include a requirement for reporting
all expenditures to the court; insurance reform to help offset the
costs of adoptions; a call for states to enact a uniform adoption law
governing compensation for birth mothers; an amendment to the
Child Welfare Act of 198027 that links the receipt of federal funds

to the passage of uniform adoption laws; and strong enforcement
incentives. Implementation of these proposals can serve to rectify
the dilemmas produced by the status quo. The recent escalation of
the problems in the adoption market illustrates the need to consider these avenues.
The current situation is forcing more and more potential adoptive families to abandon the traditional modes of adoption and to
begin exploring more extreme methods such as black market adoptions. In addition, birth mothers in search of better medical care,
greater control over the adoption process, and alternatives to the
welfare system are turning away from agency adoptions. Both independent and agency adoptions have positive and negative aspects, and it is important that each system remain intact.
However, it is time for the two systems to cooperate and work toward a common goal-the improvement of our national adoption
system. It is also time for legislators to take notice of the changes
needed in the system and to act immediately to implement them.
The first step should be the passage of a federal law requiring
uniform state adoption laws. Obviously there can be no uniformity
without such a federal statutory enactment. Although some may
object to an intrusion by the federal government in a matter of
family law, such regulation is not a novel idea. In fact, we currently have federal legislation intact that can provide a foundation
for this law. This legislation is the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980 ("Adoption Act"), 25 8 which instituted major

changes in the adoption subsidy laws. The Adoption Act involved
a major restructuring of Social Security Act programs for the care
of children who must be removed from their homes and also established a program of federal support to encourage adoptions of children with special needs. 259 The legislation linked a state's receipt

257. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670679 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
258. Id. §§ 620-628.
259. SENATE FINANCE COMM., ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND CHILD WELFARE ACT
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of federal foster care funds to the establishment of a state adoption
subsidy program. 26 Similarly, the Adoption Act could be
amended to connect the receipt of federal foster care funds to a
state's adoption of a uniform federal adoption statute.
The proposed adoption statute must initially require uniformity
in a minimum of the following areas: expanded compensation for
birth mothers, a mandatory counseling requirement for birth
mothers who desire to receive compensation, and a recommended
counseling requirement for adoptive parents. Additional requirements should include the completion of a home study no later than
one week after placement of a child in an adoptive home and preferably completion before the actual placement of a child, reporting
of all expenditures, and strong enforcement incentives.
It is time to critically examine compensation, or rather the lack
thereof, for birth mothers who are surrendering their children for
adoption. Uniformity is required to stem the rising tide of the
black market and to curb the abuse of forum shopping. At a minimum, birth mothers should be allowed remuneration for reasonable living expenses, medical expenses, legal fees, agency fees,
counseling fees, and other childbirth-related expenses.
A new test must be established for evaluating the exchange of
money between parties to an adoption. This new test should not be
based on archaic notions of paternalism or on a belief that women
are basically unable-to render a voluntary decision in matters relating to the adoption of their children. A suggested test is a true
two-tiered test which asks the following questions: (1) does the
child receive an actual benefit from the payment; and (2) if not,
does the child receive an indirect benefit from the exchange? If the
answer to either of these questions is in the affirmative, the exchange of money should be permissible. This test would allow a
birth mother to receive compensation for reasonable expenses as
long as her child receives at least an indirect benefit.
A limit, however, may need to be imposed on the exchange of
money in adoption cases to ensure the integrity of the process. For
example, guidelines similar to the child support guidelines in domestic relation cases can be easily developed regarding the amount
of allowable payments for living, medical, or other expenses. As
long as the parties stay within the guidelines, courts will presume
the payments to be legal. If the parties wish to exceed the estabOF

1980, S. REP. No. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess I (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.

1448, 1450.

260.

Id.

1991]

Compensation For Birth Mothers

lished guidelines, this should only be authorized with the court's
permission. This type of exception would likely occur where a
birth mother has a serious medical problem. Separate guidelines
could be established on a state-by-state basis to meet the specific
needs of varying rural and urban areas. Obviously, a birth
mother's living expenses will be more costly in Miami, Florida or
New York City than in Macon, Georgia or Rolla, Missouri.
Other safeguards need to be established in order for this system
to work. One of the most important precautions is mandatory
counseling for a birth mother before allowing her to receive compensation for living and other expenses. This requirement ensures
that a decision to relinquish one's child is voluntary and not coerced by the lure of money. The timing of the decision to relinquish is absolutely critical. If the decision is made prior to the
negotiations and the agreement by adoptive couples to pay expenses, it should be presumed to be voluntary.
Since agencies are already in the business of providing counseling to birth mothers concerning these issues, it is suggested that
they be the party responsible for providing mandatory counseling.26 This could help adoption agencies defray some of their rising costs. Furthermore, mandatory counseling should allay the
fears of those who worry that birth mothers will make bad decisions because of the offer of money in adoption cases.
Moreover, home studies must be completed preferably before the
placement of a child in an adoptive home but, at a minimum, absolutely no later than one week after placement. Again, adoption
agencies are already providing home studies for their clients so
they may make their services available to parties pursuing independent adoptions. This suggestion addresses a major concern
of critics of the independent process who are troubled by the placements of children in uninvestigated homes.
Discretionary counseling for adoptive parents should be made
available. All expenditures must be reported to the court for the
court's review. Either the states or the federal government need to
resume collecting data on adoptions. This has not been accomplished for over ten years and, as a result, we have no reliable statistics in this area.
Finally, the uniform adoption law must have teeth. Laws are of
little use if they are not enforced. And generally, there has been a
261.
A fund to pay for counseling could be established through fees paid by prospective adoptive parents. Once the birth mother receives compensation, she should be required to reimburse the fund for her counseling fees.
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gross lack of enforcement of laws relating to the exchange of
money in adoptions.262 In particular, officials must be given the
tools to enforce the laws properly. One suggestion is that any violation of the adoption statute be considered per se against the best
interests of the child and, therefore, result in the denial of the
adoption. This may be a harsh rule, but perhaps it is the only way
to deal a fatal blow to the abuse of the adoption system.
In addition to the passage of federal legislation requiring a uniform adoption statute, adoptive parents should be permitted to declare a tax deduction for any expenses paid by them on behalf of a
birth mother, which would have been deductible if they had actually incurred the expenses themselves. Also, insurance companies
should be encouraged to cover medical expenses paid by an adoptive parent on behalf of a birth mother in the same manner as if the
adoptive mother actually had incurred the expenses.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Our adoption laws must be revised. Prospective adoptive parents often seek adoption today to fulfill a need to establish a family.
Adoptions are no longer being pursued for the sole purpose of
guaranteeing the continuation of family lines. It is time to consider
the needs and interests of all the parties involved including the
adoptive parents, the birth parents, and the child.
It is also time to realize that the laws regulating compensation
for birth mothers are based on archaic notions of paternalism toward women. Women do not need protection from making bad
decisions regarding relinquishing a child for adoption. They are
capable of making intelligent, informed, and voluntary decisions in
these matters.
Instituting these changes will allow more equitable treatment of
birth mothers. Birth mothers already face a very difficult decision.
There is no reason to force them to live in poverty when the means
are available to allow them to live with dignity. It is time to amend
our adoption laws and belatedly welcome them into the twentieth
century.

262.

MEEZAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 211-18.

